Abstract
The Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI) says that because most past scientific theories turned out to be false, we have no reason to believe in the truthfulness of our current scientific theories. According to current consensus, this anti-realist argument presents a serious challenge to which proponents of the realist conception of science must give a response. In accordance with this requirement, some scientific realists try to demonstrate that PMI is a fallacious argument. Other realists make an attempt to block the pessimistic conclusion. The present paper offers a new perspective on the debate between scientific anti-realists and traditional scientific realists. The main argument consists of two interrelated steps. First, a structural analysis of the dialectical status of PMI is provided demonstrating that the anti-realists’ argument is internally unstable. Second, it is argued, on that basis, that an internally unstable argument like the PMI does not require any strategic response from the opponents’ side. This suggests that the consensus view is wrong: scientific realists need not respond to the challenge of PMI.
References
Alai, Mario. “Resisting the Historical Objections to Realism: Is Doppelt’s a Viable Solution?” Synthese 194 (2017): 3267–90. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1087-z
Asay, Jamin. “Going Local: A Defense of Methodological Localism About Scientific Realism.” Synthese 196 (2019): 587–609. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1072-6
Bird, Alexander. Knowing Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.
Boyd, Richard. “A Causal Theory of Evidence.” Nous 7, no. 1 (1973): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.2307/2216179
Devitt, Michael. “The Pessimistic Meta-Induction. A Response to Jacob Busch.” SATS 7, no. 2 (2006): 127–35. https://doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2006.127
Dicken, Paul. A Critical Introduction to Scientific Realism. London: Bloomsbury, 2016.
Doppelt, Gerald. “Best Theory Scientific Realism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2014): 271–91. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0090-9
Fahrbach, Ludwig. “How the Growth of Science Ends Theory Change.” Synthese 180 (2011): 139–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9602-0
Frost-Arnold, Greg. “How to Be a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist: The Problem of Misleading Evidence.” Philosophy of Science 86, no. 5 (2019): 906–17. https://doi.org/10.1086/705453
Hilpinen, Risto. “Approximate Truth and Truthlikeness.” In Formal Methods in the Methodology of the Empirical Sciences, edited by Marian Przelecki, Klemens Szaniawski, and Ryszard Wojcicki, 19–42. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1135-82
Kitcher, Paul. The Advancement of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Ladyman, James. Review of A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism, by Jarrett Leplin. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, no. 1 (1999): 181–88. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.1.181
Laudan, Larry. Progress and Its Problems. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
Laudan, Larry. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism.” Philosophy of Science 48, no. 1 (1981): 19–49. https://doi.org/10.1086/288975
Lyons, Timothy D. “Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens.” In Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense, edited by Steve Clarke and Timothy Lyons, 63–90. Dordrecht:
Springer, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2862-1_4
Lyons, Timothy D. “Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific Realism – And the Socratic Alternative.” Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9, no. 1 (2018): 146–50. https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26993
Manero, Jorge. “Structural Losses, Structural Realism and the Stability of Lie Algebras.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 91 (2022): 28–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.11.003
Mizrahi, Moti. “The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far.” Synthese 190 (2013): 3209–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0138-3
Müller, Florian. “The Pessimistic Meta-Induction: Obsolete Through Scientific Progress?” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29, no. 4 (2015): 393–412. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2015.1195144
Park, Seungbae. “A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2011): 75–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-010-9130-0
Park, Seungbae. Embracing Scientific Realism. Cham: Springer, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87813-9
Popper, Karl. “The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions.” In Problems of Scientifc Revolutions, edited by Rom Harré, 72–101. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975
Psillos, Stathis. “Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction.’” Philosophy of Science 63, no. S3 (1996): S306–S314. https://doi.org/10.1086/289965
Psillos, Stathis. Knowing the Structure of Nature. New York: Palgrave, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234666
Putnam, Hilary. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge, 1978.
Ruhmkorff, Samuel. “Global and Local Pessimistic Metainductions.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27, no. 4 (2013): 409–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2013.868185
Saatsi, T. Juha. “On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies.” Philosophy of Science 72, no. 5 (2005): 1088–98. https://doi.org/10.1086/508959
Stanford, P. Kyle. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195174089.001.0001
Walton, Douglas. Fallacies Arising from Ambiguity. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8632-0
Worrall, John. “Structural Realism: The Only Defensible Realist Game in Town?” In New Approaches to Scientific Realism, edited by Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, 169–205. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664737-009
Wray, K. Brad. Resisting Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108231633
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2024 Zoltán Vecsey